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Late Fathers' Later Children:
Reconceiving the Limits of Survivor's
Benefits in Response to Death-Defying
Reproductive Technology
ABSTRACT

When Congress instructed the Social Security Administration to
begin paying a social insurance benefit to "widows and orphans" in the
1930s, it simplified the process of determining an applicant's
relationship to an insured decedent in two significant ways: First,
Congress ordered the agency to honor the intestate laws of each state
when determining whether an applicant was actually the child of a
decedent, and second, it ordered the agency to treat any child who
could qualify as an intestate heir as if that child actually depended on
the parent financially at the time of the parent's death. Three-quarters
of a century later, advances in reproductive technology make it possible
for a child to be born decades after the death of one or both of her
genetic parents. As the law begins to explore the rights and
responsibilitiesof the parents who choose postmortem reproductionand
the children whose lives come into being through those procedures, the
heuristics that facilitated efficiency in the 1930s may yield unintended
consequences. This Note explores some of those consequences and
suggests minor alterations to the rules governing survivor's-benefits
eligibility intended to preserve the program's social insurance function
as reproductive technology transforms life after death from a hope or a
fear into a choice.
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Consider two children born on the same day in the same
hospital, the daughters of men who died two years earlier in the same
accident. Both children were conceived by the same in vitro process in
the same clinic. Both fathers worked and both employers withheld the
applicable Social Security taxes. One daughter is eligible to receive
Social Security survivor's benefits as the dependent child of her father.
The other is not. The difference has nothing to do with the children
and everything to do with a legislative strategy conceived in the
1930s, before the reproductive technology that brought those lives into
being was anything more than a twinkle in a scientist's eye.
Social Security survivor's benefits are payments made to
orphans of covered workers. They seek to provide financial support
that otherwise would have been provided by the deceased parent.'
The current regulations promulgated by the Social Security
Administration offer several ways for an applicant to demonstrate
eligibility for survivor's benefits-that is, to demonstrate that a person
is in fact a child of an insured worker. 2 Drafted to address needs and
assumptions of the mid-twentieth century, these tests initially
identified children who relied on support from a decedent at the time
of his death. 3 The wife and presumed biological children of a deceased

1.
SOC. SEc. ADMIN., SURvIvoRs BENEFITS 4 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
pubs/10084.pdf ('The loss of the family wage earner can be devastating, both emotionally and
financially. Social Security helps by providing income for the families of workers who die.").
2.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2012).
3.
The Senate report noted:
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man were uncontroversial survivors.4 Additionally, children born to a
decedent's widow within a generous gestational timeframe following
the death, though rare, were highly sympathetic candidates for
survivor status and federal benefits.5 Thus, the children who were
actually or presumptively the decedent's biological children, within
the limits of unassisted human reproduction at the time, were, and
are, at the heart of this legislation. 6
The statutes enacting and revising the program, however, do
not define precisely who those children are.7 Congress might have
declined to define this term more precisely for a number of reasons.
Families are complicated, as is family law.8 A more inclusive federal
standard might have included children whose biological parentage
was either unacknowledged or actively disputed, but a less inclusive
As a child is normally dependent upon his father or adopting father, paragraph (3)
provides that he shall be deemed so dependent unless ...
at the time of death, such
individual was not living with the child or contributing to his support and (A) the
child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or (B) the child
had been adopted by some other individual, or (C) the child, at the time of such
individual's death, was living with and supported by the child's stepfather. As a child
is not usually financially dependent upon his mother, adopting mother, or stepparent,
paragraph (4) provides that, for the purposes of paragraph (1), a child shall not be
deemed dependent upon any such individual unless ... at the time of death, no parent
other than such mother, adopting mother, or stepparent was contributing to the
support of the child and the child was not living with the father or his adopting father.
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1939, S. REP. NO. 76-734, at 44 (1939).
4.
Upon signing amendments to the Social Security Act, the President stated:
These amendments to the Act represent another tremendous step forward in
providing greater security for the people of this country. This is especially true in the
case of the federal old age insurance system which has now been converted into a
system of old age and survivors' insurance providing life-time family security instead
of only individual old age security to the workers in insured occupations. In addition
to the worker himself, millions of widows and orphans will now be afforded some
degree of protection in the event of his death whether before or after his retirement.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Statement on Signing Some Amendments to the Social
Security Act-August 11, 1939, http://www.ssa.govfhistory/fdrstmts.html#1939b (last visited Feb.
3, 2013).
5.
Intestate laws offer one avenue for demonstrating eligibility for survivor's benefits.
See infra Part II.A. Traditional intestate laws provided identical recognition to all children
conceived through sexual intercourse, whether they were born before or after their father died.
See RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 184 (2004).

6.
See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato II), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012); Schafer
v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012); see also Special
Collections: More Security H1 (1939), SoC. SECURITY HIST., http://www.ssa.gov/history/pubaffairs.
html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
7.
See infra Part II.A.
8.
See, e.g., Kansas Pursues Child Support from Sperm Donor, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec.
30, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/2012/12/29/3986152/state-pursuing-child-support-from.
html (describing a current case involving a lesbian couple and complicated state-law provisions
regarding the rights and responsibilities of sperm donors in Kansas); see generally William
Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012)
(addressing challenges in the uniform application of federal laws given differing state definitions
of marriage).
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federal standard might have excluded nonbiological children who,
nonetheless, the decedent and community recognized and supported
as family. The federal statutes establishing and amending the
survivors' benefits program avoid these conflicts by generally
deferring to state law. 9 They direct the federal administrators to use
the property-rights determinations of individual states' inheritance
laws as a proxy for the insurance-benefit decisions.' 0
In the context of a federal program designed to provide security
to the families of deceased workers, deference to family law on a
state-by-state basis was reasonable." So long as the federal program
relied on the state intestacy laws only to establish family
relationships, variation between states might have been a reasonable
accommodation to the traditional role of states in governing family
and property law.1 2 Over time, however, advances in genetic and
reproductive technology changed the fundamental assumptions that
made it reasonable to tie federal social insurance benefits to state
property law and family law.1 3 The impact of those advances is
particularly apparent when applying the law to children whose lives
are deliberately brought into being after the death of a parent covered
under social security-children whose existence depends on
technological advances that occurred long after the 1930s.14
Two features dramatically distinguish postmortem-conceived
children from historically typical applicants for survivor's benefits:
certainty about biological parentage and certainty about new financial
The genetic
support that will flow from the deceased parent.
relationship between these children and their deceased parents is
certain. Given that certainty, a postmortem-conceived child's status
9.
See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2006) (binding determinations of family
status for the purposes of Social Security benefits to the state laws in effect in the state in which
a decedent was domiciled). But see id. § 416(h)(3) (establishing alternative means for deciding
that an applicant was the child of a decedent).
10.
See id. § 416(h).
11.
See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) ("The primary state goal underlying [the
law at issue] is to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death. We long have
recognized that this is an area with which the States have an interest of considerable
magnitude." (footnote omitted)); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 62.
12.
See supra note 11.
13.
See generally James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues
Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 745 (1998) (arguing that the development of cryopreservation, in vitro
fertilization, and other reproductive technologies demand a reassessment of the laws of
inheritance, lest they "pass into obsolescence").
See Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of
14.
Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 58-64
(1994) (describing some of the reproductive procedures available in the 1990s). For additional
information regarding the current potential of reproductive technology, see also Robert Sparrow,
Orphanedat Conception: The Uncanny Offspring of Embryos, 26 BIOETHICS 173 (2012).
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as determined by state intestacy law is unhelpful in the context of
deciding survivor benefits.1 5 It is equally certain that a parent who
dies before a child is conceived will not provide additional financial
support during the life of the child-while careful estate planning may
allow a decedent to support a postmortem-conceived child financially,
the extent of that support is determined before the child is conceived. 16
The "loss" of expected parental support-a central feature of survivor's
benefits as social insurance' 7-is of a fundamentally different nature
when the parent's death precedes a deliberate and technologically
facilitated choice to procreate.1 8 Instead of guarding against the risk
that death would turn a worker's child into an orphan, standards that
include postmortem-conceived children as survivors arguably create a
new subsidy for postmortem reproduction.1 9 There may be good
reasons to adopt just such a policy,2 0 but there is no reason to accept it
as an unintended consequence of scientific progress and legislative
inertia.
Legislative inertia is a reality for statutory schemes that rely
on the written word with little administrative delegation or flexibility.
Absent legislative action, the words of a statute retain their force even
as technological progress changes their meaning, especially here,
15.
See infra Part III.A; see also, e.g., Social Security Online, PR 01115.046 South
Dakota: C. PR 93-001 Use of Genetic Testing to Establish Parent-Child Relationship
Posthumously in South Dakota, Soc. SEC. PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL Sys., https://secure.

ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/Inx/1501115046 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (citing posthumous genetic
testing that identified a 99.9 percent probability of paternity while analyzing a benefits claim).
16.
This creates challenges to analyzing the survivor's benefits as a response to an
insurable risk. See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS BROWN, AN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY:

EVOLUTION AND ISSUES 111 (1972) (defining insurable risk as "something concrete and definite
which is lost under conditions beyond the control of the insured").
17.

See SOC. SEC. BD., PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1938),

available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.html ("Under a social insurance
system the primary purpose should be to pay benefits in accordance with the presumptive needs
of the beneficiaries, rather than to make payments to the estate of a deceased employee
regardless of whether or not he leaves dependents.").
18.
See, e.g., Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2021 (2012) ("Karen and Robert Capato married
in 1999. Robert died of cancer less than three years later. With the help of in vitro fertilization,
Karen gave birth to twins 18 months after her husband's death."); cf. BROWN, supra note 16, at
112 ("A person who has, through lifelong mental or physical disability, been unfitted for gainful
employment cannot be insured against the loss of earnings which he has never had.").
19.
See infra Part III.E.
20.
It is easy to imagine various constituencies aligning to intentionally extend some
degree of postmortem reproductive benefits as compensation for military service. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Tash Anger, et al., Cryopreservationof Sperm: Indications, Methods and Results, 170 J.
UROLOGY 1079, 1079 (2003) (citing early speculation that posthumous conception might provide
an heir for "a man dying on the battlefield" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barry Dunn,
Note, Created After Death: Kentucky Law and Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 167, 167 (2009) (citing evidence that military personnel store reproductive
materials at a higher rate than other citizens and that periods of military activity correlate with
increased use of those services).
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where the Supreme Court held in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N. C.
(Capato 11) that the law as written gives the Social Security
Administration little or no leeway to adapt its regulations to react to
previously inconceivable 21 modes of reproduction. 22 Instead, relatively
clear statutory instructions require the agency to adhere to
state-by-state classifications primarily curated to facilitate orderly
distributions of unplanned estates when establishing the benefits
eligibility. Those statutory instructions do not authorize a different
standard for children who come into being through state-of-the-art
Some states are
family planning and medical intervention. 23
modifying their intestacy laws to establish new presumptions about
how to distribute a person's finite private property to future
generations that might include postmortem-conceived children. 24 As
this occurs, state-to-state variances invite perverse results like the
hypothetical situation at the beginning of this Note. 25 Moreover, when
applied to a child conceived after a parent's death, the competing
interests that shape intestacy law may or may not bear any rational
relationship to the risk-distributing function of a federal social
insurance program. 26
This Note examines the eligibility of postmortem-conceived
children 27 for Social Security survivor's benefits and considers the

21.
No pun intended.
22.
See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2034 ("[T]he law Congress enacted calls for resolution of
Karen Capato's application for child's insurance benefits by reference to state intestacy law. We
cannot replace that reference by creating a uniform federal rule the statute's text scarcely
supports.").
See infra Part II.A.
23.
See infra Part II.D.
24.
See generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Legal Status of Posthumously
25.
Conceived Child of Decedent, 17 A.L.R. 6TH 593 (2012) (illustrating different results under the
State Law
PR 01115.000
Online,
Security
states);
Social
laws
of various
Legitimation/InheritanceRights Provisions, Soc. SEC. PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYS.,

https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsfllnx/1501115000 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (presenting
examples of contested parental relationships from all fifty states, American Samoa, Puerto Rico,
and the District of Columbia analyzed under the relevant inheritance laws).
26.
The Social Security Administration stated:
Many State laws impose time limits within which someone must act to establish
paternity for purposes of intestate succession. . . . [T]o provide for an orderly and
expeditious settlement of estates. Since this is not the purpose of Social Security
benefits for children [the agency will not use those time limits to disqualify
applicants].
Application of State Law in Determining Child Relationship, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,590, 57,591 (Oct.
28, 1998) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 404).
The phrase "postmortem-conceived children" highlights the relevant, undisputed
27.
characteristics of these children. For the purposes of this Note, the phrase indicates a biological
connection to the insured decedent. It also references the relative timing of the parent's death
and the technology-assisted initiation of the pregnancy that leads to the applicant's birth. While
the distinction between true postmortem conception (from sperm or eggs banked prior to death or

LATE FATHERS' LATER CHILDREN

2013]

989

problems posed when technological innovation upends statutory
assumptions. Issues that emerged decades after Congress tethered
survivor's-benefits eligibility to state-by-state inheritance laws
illustrate how technology that transcends assumed natural limits also
complicates legal structures tailored to those perceived limits. Part I
introduces the social problem addressed by Social Security survivor's
benefits. Part II addresses the current state of the law regarding
Social Security survivor's benefits and the original goals that shaped
the development of this legal framework. Part III compares and
contrasts the core features and policy concerns of intestacy law and
survivor's benefits as they relate to postmortem-conceived children.
Part IV proposes that Congress reestablish the insurance function of
survivor's benefits through legislation that limits eligibility to children
conceived before an insured worker's death.
I. DEATH AND PAYROLL TAXES

One death is a tragedy, but a million deaths are a statistic. 2 8
When analyzing social insurance and public policy, it is important to
difference between the mundane
recognize the fundamental
predictability of some number of deaths occurring across a population
and the localized shock of each individual death.2 9 The rationale for
Social Security, and its survivor's-benefits program in particular, as a
form of social insurance, is grounded in the social utility of sharing
risk 30 without unduly diminishing individual incentives both to work
and to prepare for those aspects of the future that an individual can
control. 31

A. Death Is (Un)predictable
On an average day in the United States, more than six
thousand people die and more than ten thousand people are born. 3 2
The rough totals are predictable,3 3 but no individual death or birth is a

from sperm collected immediately after death) and postmortem implantation of embryos created
and frozen prior to death may be relevant to some analyses, this Note does not address those
issues.
28.
This is a sentiment commonly, though perhaps apocryphally, attributed to Joseph
Stalin. See, e.g., Leonard Lyons, Loose-Leaf Notebook, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1947, at 9.
29.
See infra Part I.A.
30.
See infra Part LB.
See infra Part III.D-E.
31.
32.
See U.S. POPClock Projection, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov/population/
www/popclockus.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2013) (indicating "One birth every 8 seconds" and "One
death every 12 seconds").
33.
See id.
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certainty until it occurs. Medical science can offer estimates in the
aggregate-odds of conception under certain circumstances, 34 life
expectancy following certain prognoses, 35 likelihood of a particular
pregnancy resulting in a successful birth 36-but these, too, are
group-truths and averages, rather than facts about an individual's
future.
The uncertainty surrounding individual futures matters
because there are no repeat players in life 37: every human being is
born once and dies once. 38 While it is possible to compare the odds of
that death coming by shark bite, 39 lightning strike, 40 or natural
causes, 4 1 only one death takes each person. So, while a society can
play the odds, individuals tend to be more risk averse.
Despite the powerful impact that each death has on the people
close to the decedent, only a small subset of those losses trigger a
government response. 42 The death of a parent is in that subset. The
death of a parent is a profound emotional event for most people, but
for minor children who depend on that parent for food, shelter, and
other necessities, it can also be an economic catastrophe. 43 While
policymakers can plan for a predictable number of these deaths, the

34.
See, e.g., M. Femi Ayadi et al., Contraceptive Use Among Medicaid-Covered Teens
and Risk of Teen Conception: A Longitudinal Study, 21 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 146, 150-52 (2012).
35.
See, e.g., Fumiyo Nakagawa et al., Projected Life Expectancy of People with HIV
According to Time of Diagnosis, 26 AIDS 335 (2012).
36.
See, e.g., Lena George et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Risk of
Spontaneous Abortion, 17 EPIDEMIOLOGY 500 (2006).

37.
Repeat players tend to be risk-neutral with regard to any particular encounter with
uncertainty because they can expect their multiple draws to roughly mirror the broader
probabilities. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974). "One-shot" players, by contrast, tend to
be more risk averse because their well being depends entirely on a single event which may
deviate substantially from the "typical" outcome. See generally id.
38.

See generally KEN TANAKA, EVERYBODY DIES: A CHILDREN'S BOOK FOR GROWNUPS

(2011) (explaining death in a way that even adults can understand).
39.
See, e.g., Risk of Death from Shark Attack, BANDOLIER.COM, http://www.medicine.ox.
ac.uk/bandolierfbooth/risk/shark.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) ("The risk of dying from a shark
attack anywhere in the world in 2004 was 1 in 913,200,766.").
40.
See, e.g., Robert Roy Britt, The Odds of Dying, LIVESCIENCE (Jan. 6, 2005, 2:00 AM),
http://www.livescience.com/3780-odds-dying.html (reporting lifetime odds of a US resident dying
from a lightning strike as "1-in-83,930").
41.

See, e.g., 58 ELIZABETH ARIAS,

NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS: UNITED

STATES LIFE TABLES, 2006 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsrInvsr58/
nvsr58_21.pdf.
42.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 1 ("The loss of a family wage earner can be
devastating, both emotionally and financially. Social Security helps by providing income for the
families of workers who die.").
43.
See id. But see John Kane et al., The Effect of the Loss of a Parent on the Future
Earnings of a Minor Child, 36 E. ECON. J. 370, 388 (2010) ("[T]he death of a parent appears to
have a relatively small effect on a child's lifetime earnings .... ).
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children who bear the loss cannot, making the death of a parent with
dependent children a classic candidate for social insurance. 44
B. Social-InsuranceOrigins of Social Security Survivor's Benefits
Congress established Social Security survivor's benefits to
mitigate the effects of the individually surprising but systematically
predictable catastrophe that is death by spreading the risk of a worker
dying and leaving dependent children without financial support across
the broader working population.4 5
In this sense, Social Security
survivor's benefits are insurance. 4 6 Like all insurance products, these
benefits mitigate a certain risk by collecting a relatively small
premium from a group subject to that risk and paying out more
substantial benefits to the members of that class who actually suffer
the anticipated loss. 4 7 In this case, the risk is that a working (or
retired) parent will die and that the decedent's children, deprived of
their parent's income (or retirement benefits), will suffer the
detrimental effects of childhood poverty-a result that harms both the
individuals involved and society at large. 4 8 By taxing wages and

44.
See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 1-4 (1999).

JERRY

L.

MASHAW,

TRUE SECURITY:

45.

Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012).

46.

See Insurance-4.a., OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/

Entry/97268 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012); see also BROWN, supra note 16, at 111.
47.
During World War II, a Social Security Board member stated:
In accordance with the social security law, each of these wage earners contribute to a
common fund-1 cent out of every wage dollar. Their employers contribute a similar
amount. Out of this fund the Social Security Board and the U.S. Treasury make
monthly payments to those insured workers who have become too old to work and to
the families of those who have died.
Address by Ellen S. Woodward, Member, Soc. Sec. Bd., Social Security-In War and Peace (Jan.
27, 1943), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/woodwardspeech.html. But Graetz and
Mashaw noted:
The conceptual error lies in believing that the recipients of social insurance in
retirement have "paid for their own benefits." That simply is not how Social Security
pensions in the United States work. . . . Today's retirees are supported not by
"savings" in the Social Security Trust Fund, but by the current payments of America's
workers.
GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 44, at 41.

48.
Commenting on the reason for the 1939 Social Security Act Amendments, the
Director of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance commented:
The basic purpose of all forms of social insurance is to replace a sufficient part of that
wage income when it is lost as a result of any of these hazards-unemployment,
accident, old age, or death of the wage earner-to insure not only that the individual
may look forward to protection, but that society as well may be protected against the
hazards which it faces.
Memorandum from John J. Corson, Dir., Bureau of Old-Age & Survivors Ins., to Soc. Sec. Bd.
Reg'1 Dirs., Reg'1 Reps. & Field Office Pers. on Reasons for the 1939 Amendments to the Social
Security Act (Jan. 10, 1940), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html.
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guaranteeing support for families of workers who die, this program

distributes the ex post costs of supporting a dead worker's family
among the ex ante population of workers who must plan their careers
and family lives without knowing whether they will live to earn their
next paycheck. 49
The survivor's-benefits program (like other Social Security
programs) resembles private insurance in some ways, but certain
features distinguish it as social insurance.5 0 The mandatory and
universal nature of the Social Security program is typical of social
insurance, as is its policy-oriented balancing of personal
responsibility, shared risk, and progressive financing that provides
payouts in response not only to contributions but also to relative
need.5 1 Private life-insurance policies allow an individual worker to
provide family members (or anyone else) with a source of income in
the event of the worker's death, but Social Security requires all
covered workers to contribute to a publically administered system that
provides a "fair" benefit that balances equity and adequacy. 52 While
the private insured worker negotiates the level of coverage and
dictates the beneficiaries, Social Security reflects collective policy
decisions that early in the program's history emphasized securing the
financial stability of families after the loss of a wage earner. 53
This focus on providing for families of deceased workers
represented an early shift in the goals of Social Security. 54 When
established in 1935, Social Security provided some protection against
the risks associated with poverty among the elderly.5 5 The program
targeted depression-era insecurity among US citizens approaching an
undefined period of old age and potential infirmity with finite personal
savings and the good will of family, friends, and community. 56 The
49.
50.

See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 44, at 41-42.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Social Insurance and the American Social Contract, in IN SEARCH

OF RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE CHANGING MIX OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, AND

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (Teresa Ghilarducci et al. eds., 2005).
See id. at 97-98.
51.
See id.
52.
53.

See W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM,

SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVISIONS 32-33

(1986). Brown also noted:
The new focus [following the Advisory Council of 1937-38] became adequacy and the
protection of the family unit. The principle of differential graduations in the primary
benefits related to earnings levels was confirmed, not only to sustain incentive, but
also to reflect the fact that adequacy of protection, itself, is related to the customary
costs and standards of living of the family.
BROWN, supra note 16, at 136.
54.

NAVL RES. PLANNING BD., SECURITY, WORK, AND RELIEF POLICIES 47-48 (1942),

available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/NRPB/NRPBChapter3b.pdf.
See ACHENBAUM, supra note 53, at 21-22.
55.
See id. at 16-17.
56.
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program provided payments to the oldest US citizens to prevent the
elderly from dying in poverty once they outlasted the resources they
had accumulated during their working years.5 7
In 1938, the Advisory Council on Social Security recommended
adding a survivor's-insurance program to Social Security "intended
primarily for the protection of the dependent orphans of deceased
wage earners."5 8 President Franklin D. Roosevelt celebrated the 1939
amendments that enacted this recommendation as "another
tremendous step forward in providing greater security for the people
of this country," emphasizing that the conversion of the "federal old
age insurance system" into an "old age and survivors' insurance"
system would protect "millions of widows and orphans . . . in the event
of [a worker's] death . . . ."59 Thus, Social Security survivor's benefits

reflect collective policy decisions that, early in the program's history,
established an emphasis on securing the financial stability of families
after the loss of a wage earner. 60
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Congress has revisited Social Security repeatedly since 1939.61
Although there have been several significant amendments and Social
Security programs remain perennial topics of political debate, 62 the
fundamental features of the survivor's-benefits program remain
recognizable. 63 Indeed, the stability of the code governing survivor's

57.
The accompanying House Report noted:
This situation necessitates two complementary courses of action: We must relieve the
existing distress and should devise measures to reduce destitution and dependency in
the future. Thus far in the depression, we have merely attempted to relieve existing
distress, but the time has come for a more comprehensive and constructive attack on
insecurity. The foundations of such a program are laid in the present bill.
H.R. REP. No. 74-615, at 3 (1935).
58.
Reports & Studies: 1938 Advisory Council, SOC. SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.
gov/history/reports/38advise.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
59.
See Roosevelt, supra note 4.
60.
See ACHENBAUM, supra note 53, at 32-33. Brown also observed:
The new focus [following the Advisory Council of 1937-38] became adequacy and the
protection of the family unit. The principle of differential graduations in the primary
benefits related to earnings levels was confirmed, not only to sustain incentive, but
also to reflect the fact that adequacy of protection, itself, is related to the customary
costs and standards of living of the family.
BROWN, supra note 16, at 136.
61.
See generally GEOFFREY KOLLMANN & CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., MAJOR DECISIONS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE ON SOCIAL SECURITY: 1935-2000 (2001),

available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/crsleghist3.html.
See generally id.
62.
63.
Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680
(2012). Compare Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 202(c), 53 Stat.
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benefits in the face of change both in reproductive technology and in
the associated fields of state law is the central issue in this Note.
A. The Code
The portion of the US Code that governs children's survivor's
benefits is 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). 64 It establishes eligibility for "every
child. . . of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured
individual," subject to certain restrictions.6 5
First, as an
administrative matter, the child must apply for benefits.6 6 Second, a
child without a qualifying disability must be unmarried and not older
than eighteen (or nineteen if still enrolled in school).67 Third, the child
applying as a survivor also must have been dependent upon the
decedent at the time of his death. 68 The law deems that a child is
dependent upon his father. .. or his mother. .. at the time [of the parent's death],
unless, at such time, [the parent] was not living with or contributing to the support of
[the] child and [either the] child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of [the
69
decedent] or [the] child had been adopted by some other individual.

'

Each surviving child who meets these requirements is eligible to gain
access to 75 percent of the deceased parent's primary Social Security
benefits,7 0 subject to limitations on the total benefits provided based
on an individual worker's primary benefits.7
The definition of "child" cited in § 402(d) begins-in a tautology
that suggests that the legislators were more interested in building on
the term "child" than in precisely defining it-by explaining that "[t]he
term 'child' means (1) the child . .. of an individual . . . ."72 The
legislative definition then expands beyond circular reference to
embrace adopted children, well-established stepchildren, and certain
otherwise-unsupported grandchildren. 7 3
So, instead of defining
1360, 1364-65 (1939), with 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006) (evincing similarities that still exist in the
program).
64.
42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (authorizing various benefits to the dependent children of insured
workers).
65.
Id. § 402(d)(1) (emphasis added); see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text
addressing the ambiguous meaning ascribed to the term "child."
Id. § 402(d)(1)(A).
66.
67.
Id. § 402(d)(1)(B). Age limits vary depending on other circumstances. See id.
§ 402(d).
68.
Id. § 402(d)(1)(C).
69.
Id. §§ 402(d)(3)-(d)(3)(B). Section 402(d)(3) recognizes that a child can be dependent
upon his "[parent] or adopting [parent]," suggesting that biology is not the only consideration
when assessing survivor status. See id. § 402(d)(3).
70.
Id. § 402(d)(2).
71.
See id. § 403.
72.
See id. § 416(e).
73.
See id.
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"child," it establishes a legislative category that builds on the common
understanding of the term child.7 4
Isolated from the broader context of the statute, that broad
category might easily expand to encompass the limits of reproductive
technology; however, the legislation provides more specific guidance
regarding the meaning of "child" in subsequent sections of the Act. 75
For example, when "determining whether an applicant is the
child ...

of [an] . . . insured individual for purposes of [42 U.S.C.],"

§ 416(h)(2) establishes that
[T]he commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in
determining the devolution of intestate personal property . .. by the courts of the State
in which [the insured individual] was domiciled at the time of death, or, if such
individual . .. was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of
76
Columbia.

Additional language in § 416(h) provides that an applicant who does
not qualify as a decedent's child under the state intestacy law
provisions of § 416(h)(2) may nevertheless qualify as that person's
child7 7 if, before the parent died, either the parent acknowledged the
child in writing,78 a court decree established the parental
relationship,7 9 or a court ordered the parent to support the child
financially on the basis of a parental relationship.80 In addition to
these express acknowledgements and judicial determinations,
"evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner of Social Security" may
also establish that the insured individual was the applicant's parent
and lived with or supported the applicant when the insured individual
died.81
While other classes of survivor's benefits require evidence of
actual dependency, § 402(d)(3) deems children to be dependent on
their parents. 82 The presumption that a child is dependent upon her
parents or adopted parents eliminates the need for children to
demonstrate dependency and for the agency to evaluate dependency. 83

74.
See id.
75.
See id. § 416 (establishing "additional definitions" "for the purposes of this
subchapter"); see also infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
76.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).
77.
Id. § 416(h)(3).
78.
Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I).
79.
Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II).
80.
Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I).
81.
Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
82.
Id. § 402(d)(3). Although the deceased parents of postmortem-conceived descendants
were, by definition, not "living with or contributing to the support" of their as-yet unconceived
children at their death, the additional restrictions from § 402(d)(3)(A)-(B) keep
postmortem-conceived descendants within the scope of the deemed support. See id.
83.
See id.
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The presumption covers children conceived before and born after a
father's death. 84 It extends equal status to children whose parents
failed to provide support during their lives. 85 The Code places certain
limits on this presumption, recognizing the legal and practical impact
of adoptions. 86 It also definitively establishes the legal fiction that any
postmortem-conceived child whom state intestate law recognizes as
the insured decedent's child drew financial support from a parent who
died long before the child's conception.87
Taken together, these requirements clarify the status of
postmortem-conceived children. There can be no evidence that an
applicant and a decedent lived together when the decedent died before
the applicant was conceived.8 8 The statutory mechanisms for direct
acknowledgement of the relationship by the decedent or through court
proceedings are likewise unavailable to children whose parents die
before their conception. 89 The remaining standard-the borrowing of
state intestacy law-is therefore the only statutory mechanism that
can determine that a postmortem-conceived child is a "child" of an
insured worker under Social Security.90 If a child meets that state
standard, that child is deemed to have been dependent on the
deceased parent at the time that parent died.9 1
B. Administrative and JudicialInterpretationsof
Postmortem-Conceived Children's Eligibility
The Social Security Administration adopted precisely the
reading of the code described above, determining that if a child
conceived after the death of an insured decedent is ineligible to inherit
property from that decedent under state intestacy law, the child is
likewise ineligible to receive survivor's benefits. 92 The Social Security
Administration, following § 416(h)(2), uses the intestacy laws of an

84.
See id.
85.
See id.
86.
See id. § 402(d)(3)(B).
87.
See id. § 402(d)(3).
88.
See id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
See id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(III) (requiring the "acknowledgement, court decree, or court
89.
order" to be made before the decedent's death).
90.
See id. § 416(h)(2)(A).
91.
See id. § 402(d)(3).
92.
Social Security Online, GN 00306.001 Determining Status as Child, Soc. SEC.
PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANuAL SYS., https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsfllnx/0200306001
(last visited Jan. 13, 2013) ("A child conceived by artificial means after the [insured's] death
cannot be entitled under the Federal law provisions of the Act (section 216(h)(3)). Such a child
can only be entitled if he or she has inheritance rights under applicable State intestacy law.").
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insured decedent's last state of residence. 93 A child who can inherit
under that state's intestacy laws qualifies as a child of the decedent
for the purposes of granting survivor's benefits. 94 A child who cannot
inherit under the most accommodating version of state intestacy law
in force between the death of the parent and the child's application for
benefits does not qualify for survivor's benefits. 95 Not surprisingly,
this definition drew challenges from parents of postmortem-conceived
children in states where the intestacy laws do not recognize
postmortem-conceived
children
after
the
Social
Security
Administration denied their applications for survivor's benefits.96
In 2004, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the agency's interpretation of the Code, holding that,
regardless of the method or timing of conception, all biological children
whose parentage was not in question were eligible for survivor's
benefits. 97 The Social Security Administration followed this ruling
only within the Ninth Circuit, creating a unique standard for that
region.9 8 Several years later, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits affirmed
the Social Security Administration's general interpretation limiting
benefits to those postmortem-conceived children who met state
intestate-law standards, although they disagreed about the
reasoning.9 9 The Fourth Circuit held this was the unambiguous
requirement of the Social Security Act.100
The Eighth Circuit,
however, found the statute to be ambiguous before extending Chevron
93.
In applying state law it is determined:
Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act (the Act) states in part that in
determining whether an applicant is the child of a deceased insured individual, the
Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) shall apply such law as would be
applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of
the State in which the insured individual was domiciled at the time of his or her
death.
Application of State Law In Determining Child Relationship, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,590, 57,591 (Oct.
28, 1998) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404).
94.
See id.
95.
When applying state law, it is noted:
Therefore, when the insured is deceased, we will determine the status of such a child
by applying the State inheritance law that is in effect when we adjudicate the child's
claim for benefits. If the child does not have inheritance rights under that version of
State law, we will apply the State law that was in effect when the insured died, or any
version of State law in effect from the time the child first could be entitled to benefits
based on his or her application until the time we make our final decision on the claim,
whichever version is more beneficial to the child.
Id.
96.
See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
97.
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2004).
98.
See SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).
99.
Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679
(2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 62-63 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012).
100.
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 62-63.
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deference' 0 1 to what it found to be a reasonable administrative
interpretation. 102 That same year, the Third Circuit read § 416(h) to
apply only to nonbiological children. 103 The Third Circuit's decision
aligned closely with the Ninth Circuit's decision, reinforcing the
circuit split over the proper application of the venerable statute in an
era marked by DNA testing and steadily advancing reproductive
technology.1 04 The Supreme Court finally addressed that split by
granting certiorari to the Third Circuit case.10 The Court held both
that the Social Security Administration's reading of the statute was
entitled to Chevron deference 0 6 and that the text did not support the
interpretations advanced by the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
decisions. 10

C. Capato II
The Court in Capato II decisively rejected the argument that
genetic kinship trumped the statutory framework governing benefits
eligibility, resolving the circuit split and effectively foreclosing
administrative reinterpretation of the statute. 108 Capato II directly
addressed the question of whether it was necessary to look to § 416(h)
when a postmortem-conceived child-undeniably the biological child of
an insured decedent-seeks to establish eligibility for survivor's
benefits as "the child . .. of an individual" under § 416(e) alone. 0 9
Karen Capato, applying for survivor's benefits on behalf of her twin
sons born through in vitro fertilization after the death of her insured
101.
Chevron deference prevents courts from second-guessing administrative-agency
interpretations of ambiguous portions of those statutes entrusted to particular agencies by
Congress. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984); see, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959-60.
102.
Id. at 963-64.
103.
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (Capato 1), 631 F.3d 626, 630 (3d Cir.
2011), rev'd sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato 11), 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
104.
Compare Capato 1, 631 F.3d at 630 (3d Cir.), and Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371
F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2004), with Beeler, 651 F.3d at 963-64 (8th Cir.), and Schafer, 641 F.3d at
62-63 (4th Cir.). See also Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2030 (discussing some of the relevant changes
in reproductive technology and law between the 1939 amendments and the present).
105.
CapatoH, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; see infra Part II.C.
CapatoH, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
106.
107.
The Court in Capato II noted:
Tragic circumstances-Robert Capato's death before he and his wife could raise a
family-gave rise to this case. But the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of
Karen Capato's application for child's insurance benefits by reference to state
intestacy law. We cannot replace that reference by creating a uniform federal rule the
statute's text scarcely supports.
Id. at 2034.
See id. at 2030, 2034.
108.
109.
Id. at 2029.
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husband, Robert Capato, had convinced the Third Circuit that
§ 416(h) did not apply to children like her sons. 110 The Third Circuit
accepted Capato's argument that, since there was no doubt about the
biological origins of the twins, there was also no need to consult a
section of the statute designed to facilitate the "determination of
family status.""n The Supreme Court disagreed.11 2 Following this
decision, state-specific intestate-law analysis became determinative of
postmortem-conceived children's eligibility for survivor's benefits. 113
D. Intestacy Law and Postmortem-Conceived Children
Intestacy law provides a set of state-specific default rules for
distributing the property of state residents who die without a will.' 1 4

State intestacy laws focus intensely-even rigidly-on family status as
defined by blood, marriage, and adoption.11 5 The distribution schemes
typically make no distinction based on economic reliance on the
decedent or on the economic needs of the recipients.1 16 Instead, they
"mechanistically" distribute a decedent's estate based on shares
assigned by legal and biological degrees of separation.1 17
Most states have not yet amended their intestacy laws to
address the possibility of heirs born years after the death of a
biological parent.1 18 Those that have addressed the potential for
postmortem-conceived children have understandably focused on the
needs of the state and the interests of property owners within the
state.1 19 Predictably, different states addressed the issue by different
means.1 2 0
Several states adopted variations on the Uniform
110.
Id.
111.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Capato I, 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011),
rev'd sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato II), 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
112.
Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2029.
113.
See id. at 2034.
114.
E.g., Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV.
199, 206 (2001).
115.
Id. at 206-08.
116.
See id. at 208-09.
Id.
117.
118.
See infra notes 128-137; see also Alycia Marie Kennedy, Note, Posthumous
Conception and the Social Security Act, 54 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2132532## ("Only eleven states
have statutes dealing explicitly with posthumously conceived children.").
119.
See, e.g., Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions:
Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
251, 296 (1999) (citing the orderly administration of estates and discouraging unfounded claims
as common state interests that lead to excluding postmortem-conceived children as heirs).
120.
See Kennedy, supra note 118; see also David Shayne & Christine Quigley, Defining
'Descendants': Science Outpaces Traditional Heirship, 38 EST. PLAN. J. 14, 16 (2011) ("State
statutes do not offer any consistency.").
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Parentage Act (UPA), a piece of model legislation that addresses
relationships between parents and children and includes provisions
for recognizing postmortem-conceived children as heirs under certain
circumstances. 12 1 Others have drafted their own qualifications for
recognizing postmortem-conceived children as heirs. 122 Still others
have relied on courts to address the issues that arise when
ambiguities in laws drafted in earlier eras create disputes involving
inheritance and postmortem-conceived children.123
The UPA addresses a plethora of family law issues arising
when the legal relationship between adults and their "children" is
uncertain.124 This uncertainty complicates adoptions, child-support
arrangements,
sperm-and-egg-donation
agreements, gestational
agreements, and inheritance rights. 125
In addressing these
traditionally state-governed areas of family law, property law, and
contract law, the UPA relies heavily on intent and express consent to
establish a person's parental relationship to a child. 126 A person who
plans to reproduce after death-even a person who was unwilling to
reproduce while alive-can effectively establish a legal parent-child
relationship with a postmortem-conceived child in a jurisdiction that
has adopted the UPA. 127
Massachusetts provides an example of a common-law approach
to addressing the status of postmortem-conceived children. 128 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the first high court to
issue a decision regarding inheritance rights of "children conceived
from the gametes of a deceased individual." 12 9 Massachusetts law
121.
The Act states:
Article 7 deals with parentage when there is assisted conception and incorporates the
earlier Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act into the 2002 Uniform
Parentage Act almost without change. If a man and a woman consent to any sort of
assisted conception, and the woman gives birth to the resultant child, they are the
legal parents. A donor of either sperm or eggs used in an assisted conception may not
be a legal parent under any circumstances.
ParentageAct Summary, UNIFORM L. COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?
title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
122.
See, e.g., infra notes 135, 137 and accompanying text.
123.
See, e.g., infra notes 129-132, 134 and accompanying text.
124.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.
uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa-final_2002.pdf.
125.

See id.

126.
Compare id. § 702 (establishing that "a donor is not a parent of a child"), with id.
§§ 703-704 (establishing that a man who "provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by a woman" is the resulting child's father), and id. § 707 (establishing that a
deceased individual who consented to becoming a parent through postmortem conception may be
a legal parent to a postmortem-conceived child).
127.
See id. §§ 703-704, 707.
128.
See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Mass. 2002).
129.
Id. at 261 (footnote omitted).

2013]

LATE FATHERS' LATER CHILDREN

1001

provided inheritance rights to a decedent's "issue." The high court
relied heavily on state interests in promoting the welfare of children
conceived before or after a parent's death, the efficient administration
of estates, and the reproductive rights of both biological parents to
determine whether "issue" included postmortem-conceived children.130
The Massachusetts court declared that, at a minimum, a claim for
inheritance rights on behalf of postmortem-conceived children must
include evidence of the appropriate genetic relationship, the
decedent's consent to postmortem reproduction, and the decedent's
consent to support any postmortem-conceived children. 131 Thus, the
Massachusetts court established a decedent's intentions as a critical
factor for analyzing a postmortem-conceived child's claim against an
estate.
Time limits also factor prominently in intestacy law. 132 These
limits advance a common state preference for quick and decisive
distribution of estates that allow market forces to put resources to
their most productive uses. The Massachusetts court noted, but did
not decide, the question of how soon a postmortem-conceived child
must be born following the death of a parent in order to receive
inheritance benefits,1 33 but legislatures in other states and scholars
have repeatedly identified timeliness as a significant feature of a
postmortem-conceived child's inheritance claim.134
Similar to
Massachusetts, California requires evidence of a decedent's intent to
procreate posthumously and sets a two-year time limit within which a
child must be in utero in order to be treated as an heir under intestacy
law. 135 Louisiana provides for a maximum of three years between
death and birth in order for a posthumously conceived child to make a
claim against an estate, and it requires evidence that the decedent
intended the posthumous creation of a legal heir. 136 Scholars, like
legislatures, advocate solutions that balance state interests,
decedents' interests, and heirs' interests, typically requiring clear
evidence of the decedent-parent's intent and setting a time limit long
enough to allow for grieving and conceiving but not so long that the

130.
See id. at 263-65; see generally Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing:
Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 416-20 (2009)
(analyzing the reasoning of the Massachusetts court).
131.
Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.
132.
See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 59 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680
(2012); infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
133.
See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 267-68.
134.
See infra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
135.
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (Deering 2013).
136.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2012).
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administrators and other heirs are unduly inconvenienced waiting for
heirs who may never be born.13 7
In sum, while variability is a hallmark of policies entrusted to
the laboratories of democracy (the states), the states' approaches to
incorporating postmortem conception into estate distribution tend to
emphasize the same basic features. Consistent with estate law, as
well as property law generally, the decedent's clearly expressed wishes
regarding both the creation of postmortem-conceived children and the
distribution of assets carry significant weight. Also, time limits
generally favor resolving disputes over months or a small number of
years rather than freezing assets for an extended period of time. As
states alter their intestacy laws to respond to the possibility of
postmortem-conceived children, both advancing technology and
responsive changes to state intestacy laws make it prudent to consider
postmortem-conceived children's eligibility for survivor's benefits. Do
the policy motivations behind survivor's benefits favor eligibility for
postmortem-conceived children?
III. FIT AND FRICTION: THE COMPETING RATIONALES UNDERLYING
INTESTACY LAW AND SOCIAL INSURANCE

It may have been both necessary and beneficial in the 1930s for
federal legislation to defer uncertain determinations about eligibility
to the states' various legal paradigms.1 38 Now, however, although the
relationships at the core of intestacy law and survivor's insurance are
similar,1 39 the purposes of the two fields of law are not always
The similar goals and circumstances of Social
commensurate.
Security survivor's benefits and state intestacy laws help to explain
why the latter was and is a good guide for the former in most
harmonious
typically
systems'
But the
circumstances.1 4 0
they
evaluate
when
outcomes
conflicting
dictate
purposes
postmortem-conceived children's claims.141

137.
See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 130, at 443.
138.
Describing Social Security's beginnings, Achenbaum noted:
One of the most important facts to remember about the early years of social security is
that it got off to a slow start. Without a large staff or even the money that had been
appropriated to hire administrators, the Social Security Board's three members and
their assistants had to establish procedures for a maze of new programs.
ACHENBAUM, supra note 53, at 27.
139.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
140.
See infra Part III.B-E.
141.
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A. Family Focused
Survivor's benefits are most beneficial to a decedent's family
when they replace the lost income quickly-before lost wages lead to
missed payments.1 4 2
State intestacy laws-also triggered by
unexpected deaths-had (and continue to have) a related interest in
identifying heirs and achieving a timely resolution to estate-related
disputes so that life and commerce continue. This common purpose
made existing bodies of state intestacy law valuable resources for a
new federal program such as Social Security that aimed to deliver
targeted benefits to assist families after the untimely death of a wage
earner.1 4 3 Although the federal program distributed publically funded
benefits and the states' systems were providing the orderly
disbursement of privately accumulated wealth, 144 both Social Security
and state intestacy laws attempted to direct the resources under their
care toward the dependent family members of a decedent.
For example, under typical1 45 state intestacy laws, the ranking
of presumptive heirs began with a legal spouse and children before
extending to parents, siblings, and other more distant relatives. 14 6
The emphasis on keeping property within the household of the
decedent had obvious benefits for a Social Security program focused on
"family security" for "widows and orphans." 147 Intestacy law similarly
allowed quick and final determinations of rights and relationships.1 48
The state had an interest in clearing title quickly so that market
forces could put property to its most economically beneficial use. 149
The federal government was also interested in quickly providing
widows and orphans with benefits payments to partially replace the

142.

See, e.g., NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM FDR's VISION

To BUSH'S GAMBLE 1-3 (2005) (describing the Social Security Administration's response to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that resulted in thousands of victims' family members
receiving their first survivor's benefits checks by October 3, 2001).
143.
See Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Marital Status and Eligibility for Federal Statutory
Income Benefits: A HistoricalSurvey, 52 WASH. L. REV. 227, 261-62 (1977).
144.
See infra Part III.B.
145.
That these prioritizations are for the most part "typical" does not suggest that they
are "natural"; ranking and resolving claims to the property of the dead is fundamentally a policy
challenge subject to a variety of solutions. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 114, at 252-71 (exploring
several alternatives to the typical family paradigm in inheritance law, beginning with the
elimination of inheritance). Similarly, the alignment between a body of law and a separate policy
goal in one era does not ensure similar compatibility in all eras. For example, the inheritance
laws that inform Jane Austen novels would probably not be of much use to a Victorian era
program attempting to provide survivor's benefits to widows and orphans.
146.
See BRASHIER, supra note 5, at 10-11.
147.
See BROWN, supra note 16, at 140-45.
148.
See infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
149.
Lewis, supra note 130, at 443; see infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
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wages that they lost through the sudden death of a worker.15 0
Although disagreements about estates may drag out over months or
years, a person's status as an heir is generally established by the
relationship to the decedent at the time of death. This shared
emphasis on the welfare of decedents' families makes intestacy law a
potentially compatible source for survivor's-benefits-eligibility
standards.
B. PrivateProperty and Public Funds
While intestacy law and survivor's-benefits determinations
both funnel resources to decedents' families, the different sources of
those resources-personal property in intestacy law and federal funds
in survivor's benefits-justify different analyses.1 5 ' Intestacy law
reflects society's judgment that one person's death should not result in
property being removed from circulation or tied up in extended legal
disputes because of the decedent's inadequate estate planning.1 52
Survivor's benefits reflect society's judgment that one person's death
should not result in destitute orphans.1 53 Although both intestacy law
and survivor's benefits reflect public-policy choices, intestacy law
redirects private resources back into economic use in a way that
happens to benefit surviving family members,1 54 while survivor's
benefits commit public funds to achieve their primary goal of
supporting survivors.1 55
The branches of law that distribute or restrict private property
are understandably influenced by owners' intentions, but the
distribution of public funds (through social insurance) prioritizes
150.
See ALTMAN, supra note 142, at 2 ("Social Security recognized that it was vital to get
benefits to the families quickly.").
151.
Discussing survivor's benefits as a pool of resources distinct from a decedent's
estate, Professor Brashier asserts:
But if the children inherited nothing from his estate, then why should it matter
whether they were his heirs? . . . The primary reason for seeking an heirship
determination . . . was to make the children eligible for Social Security benefits as the
heirs of their father, a deceased worker. In short, the children were not seeking to
take from their father's estate but from the government.
BRASHIER, supra note 5, at 185-86.
152.

See id. at 188; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS div. 1, pt.

.

1, intro. note (1983) (rationalizing the Rule Against Perpetuities as a mechanism for ensuring
that living owners of property are able to put that property to good use without interference from
"the dead hand" of a deceased owner or the uncertainty inherent in superseding interests that
might vest in as-yet unborn owners).
153.
See Roosevelt, supra note 4 ("In addition to the worker himself, millions of widows
and orphans will now be afforded some degree of protection in the event of his death . .
154.
See BRASHIER, supra note 5, at 185-86.
155.
See Roosevelt, supra note 4 ("In addition to the worker himself, millions of widows
and orphans will now be afforded some degree of protection in the event of his death . . . .").
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law, therefore, exercises public judgment in response to absent or
ineffective private estate planning without providing public funding;
the heirs of a decedent with a will but no wealth receive nothing, while
the heirs of a decedent with wealth but no will receive whatever
portions of the estate the state's intestacy laws direct toward them. In
the social-insurance realm of survivor's benefits, however, public
policy first determines how much assistance (if any) is warranted and
only then provides public funds to meet that need. 15 7 Just as estate
law is not implicated when a person dies without property, survivor's
benefits are not implicated when someone dies without leaving behind
actual surviving dependents.1 5 8
C. Decedents'Intentions
A deep sense that the law should allow private-property owners

to bequeath their private property to whomever they wish informs
estate law, but it has no analogue when applied to the public funds
implicated by survivor's benefits.1 5 9 So, while policies incorporating
postmortem-conceived children into state inheritance laws ought to
balance decedents' intentions against other concerns, there is no
corresponding justification for introducing decedents' intentions into a
survivor's-benefits analysis. 160
Since the fundamental goal of intestacy law is to put property
back in circulation in an orderly fashion, any successful assignment of
property to a new owner is socially beneficial. 161 But intestacy law is
also part of a broader estate-distribution system that generally prefers
to carry out the intentions of the decedent. 162 Thus, state courts and
legislatures continue to consider the intentions of decedents when
modifying state estate-planning laws to address complications
156.
See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 44, at 42-45 (addressing the question, "how
much social insurance is enough?" as a challenge to society to balance certain costs and benefits).
157.
See ACHENBAUM, supra note 53, at 32-33 (describing tests for benefits eligibility
and rates that were independent from an implicit government guarantee to make up for any
difference between program expenditures and current payroll taxes); see also PETER J. FERRARA,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION

113-17

(1980)

(exploring with umbrage

several ways by which public-policy determinations distinguish survivor's benefits from private
insurance benefits).
158.
See BROWN, supra note 16, at 136 (explaining the comparative paucity of coverage
provided to single workers whose deaths would not generate survivor's benefits as illustrative of
the general Social Security program's value of "adequacy" of coverage as opposed to an exclusive
commitment to "equity").
159.
See supra Part III.B.
160.
See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 44, at 41; see also FERRARA, supra note 157.
161.
See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978).
162.
See, e.g., Foster, supranote 114, at 209-10.
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introduced by evolving family structures and reproductive
technology. 163 This distinguishes estate law from social-insurance
programs in which the decedent does not "own" survivor's benefits and
has no property right in them that might be transferred based on the
decedent's intent. 164
Even to the extent that the family relationships that govern
eligibility reflect the decedent's intentions-at least with respect to
marriage and adoptions that require individual assent-Social
Security makes it difficult for dying individuals to "game" the
system. 16 5 Consistent with its original purposes, Social Security
legislation limits dying workers' ability to manufacture dependent
relationships-and corresponding entitlements-through adoption or
marriage.16 6 A marriage of less than nine months does not establish
eligibility for spousal survivor's benefits. 16 7 A similar nine-month
restriction applies to stepchildren, 1 68 and a support test for
adoptions 169 (along with time restrictions) limits dependent
relationships to those who actually depended on an insured decedent.
These limits suggest legislative intent to channel benefits toward
those with established need and reasonable expectations of support
(but for death) while preventing sophisticated actors from
manufacturing relationships in order to direct benefits from "their"
Social Security to people not otherwise entitled to survivor's
benefits. 170
Decedents' bare intentions to provide support through Social
Security have never been relevant for social-insurance purposes.1 7 1
Actual prior support of a survivor by a decedent has always been the
163.
See supra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.
164.
See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 44, at 41.
165.
See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
166.
See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
167.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(1)(E), 416(g)(1)(E) (2006).
168.
See id. § 416(e)(2).
The statute notes:
169.
For purposes of [the clause providing benefits to adopted children], a person shall be
deemed, as of the date of death of an individual, to be the legally adopted child of such
individual if such person was either living with or receiving at least one-half of his
support from such individual at the time of such individual's death and was legally
adopted by such individual's surviving spouse after such individual's death but only if
(A) proceedings for the adoption of the child had been instituted by such individual
before his death, or (B) such child was adopted by such individual's surviving spouse
before the end of two years after ... the day on which such individual died ....

§ 416(e).
170.
See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58-59 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2680 (2012).
171.
See generally BROWN, supra note 16, at 111-13 (describing the general features of
social insurance as including a primary emphasis on socially recognized need, rather than
private insurance's focus on quid pro quo equity).
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standard for evaluating dependency, because dependency is
fundamentally about need-in this case, needs that will no longer be
met following a death. 172 Social insurance is not an estate-planning
tool by which individuals can impact the lives that remain after their
death; it is instead a social program through which society replaces
some of the financial support that a survivor would have received if
the wage earner were living. 173 While a decedent may exercise
personal
intentions
through
optional
life
insurance
and
estate-planning tools, Social Security is mandatory. 174 It is neither
voluntary nor customizable,17 6 and its reliance on the financial
commitments made by an insured worker during that worker's
lifetime does not create an obligation to honor or even consider the
wishes of a decedent when administering the program. 176
Notably, Social Security ignores decedents' express wishes
when dealing with other potential survivors.1 77 It neither provides
benefits to nor withholds them from applicants based on whether an
insured worker's will names an applicant.1 78 Social Security's function
as social insurance rather than life insurance leads it to distribute
benefits strictly on the basis of an established expectation of ongoing
support. 179 A plan that explicitly contemplates a future in which a
parent has died cannot serve as evidence that the parent intended to
provide ongoing support as a wage earner.
Therefore,
when
considered
in
the
context
of
postmortem-conceived children, the decedent's wishes for how those
children should be included in the distribution of an estate are
inapposite. 18 0 While it may be important to consider the decedent's
reproductive and property rights when determining the fate of the
preserved genetic material that makes postmortem reproduction
possible, 18 1 the decedent's wishes do not deserve any weight when
determining a social-insurance program's response to those decisions.
172.
173.

See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 58-59.
Id. at 58.

174.

Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1968).

175.

See Mashaw, supra note 50, 98-99.

176.

See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 44, at 41.

177.
See supra Part II.A (describing the eligibility requirements for survivor's benefits).
178.
See supra Part II.A.
179.
See BROWN, supra note 16, at 112 ("[Tjhe emphasis upon imputed need involves the
extension of the protection afforded from the primary beneficiary, whose earnings or health are
lost, to those assumed to be or to have been dependent upon him and his earnings.").
180.
See supra Part II.D.
181.
As a legal matter, cryogenically stored embryos-and to a lesser extent sperm and
eggs-exhibit characteristics of property while also receiving special attention as a result of their
capacity to develop into fully autonomous human beings. See BRASHIER, supra note 5, at 181-83;
Bailey, supra note 13, at 748-80.
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A parent's intent to support a child born from that material may be
entitled to substantial respect during the distribution of the estate,
but it is irrelevant for survivor's benefits. Even a parent who would
have been willing to provide support is clearly no longer able to do so.
Decisions by states to enforce wills that include planned
postmortem-conceived children as heirs or to accommodate certain
postmortem-conceived children in default intestate systems do not
make it reasonable to assume that a person who died last year will
earn money next year to support a person conceived this year. Since
decedents' intentions are incorporated through Social Security's
reliance on state inheritance provisions, it may be necessary to blunt
the impact of these new and irrelevant considerations on the
survivor's-benefit program if they turn out to be not only irrelevant,
but also harmful.
D. Moral Hazards
The disqualification of manufactured dependents limited the
risk of moral hazards in the survivor's-benefits program; 182 people
intent on getting more out of the system for their dependents had to
either increase their base benefits level by earning (and contributing)
more money or increase their number of dependents by actually
supporting more people. 183 The one notable exception to this rule in
the 1930s was a child conceived shortly before the father's death. 184
When a father died in the several months between conception and
birth, his child would be eligible for survivor's benefits-even though
the standard tests of support might not apply-because inheritance
law broadly recognized these children as heirs to their fathers (as it
typically does today).18 5
This active-pregnancy exception in intestacy law creates at
most a theoretical moral-hazard problem of an insured worker maxing

See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
182.
See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 6 ("How much your family can get from
183.
Social Security depends on your average lifetime earnings. That means the more you have
earned, the more their benefits will be."); ALTMAN, supra note 142, at 80 ("Those who contributed
more in absolute dollars to the system-workers with higher wages-received higher benefits in
absolute dollars.").
See supraPart II.A; infra note 185 and accompanying text.
184.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2012) (establishing that under Georgia's
185.
rules of intestate succession "[c]hildren of the decedent who are born after the decedent's death
are considered children in being at the decedent's death, provided they were conceived prior to
the decedent's death, were born within ten months of the decedent's death, and survived 120
hours or more after birth"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (2012) ("Relatives of the decedent
conceived before the decedent's death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the
lifetime of the decedent."); see also BRASHIER, supra note 5.
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out his survivor's benefits by reproducing aggressively after learning
that he is likely to die soon, thereby establishing his unborn children
as his legal heirs. Language limiting this exception to those children
conceived before the parent's death and born within a generous
quasi-gestational timeframe following the death clearly marks this
policy as an accommodation to the liminal qualities of pregnancy. 8 6
Since prognoses of death are still only predictions, 8 7 even a dying man
intent on getting the most out of his Social Security benefits through
his survivors-or, more plausibly, a dying man whose decision to
make his genetic mark on the world was influenced by the promise of
survivor's benefits-would have to consider all the other social and
financial consequences of fathering children.
Modern reproductive technology changes the chronological
relationship between death and reproduction 8 8 and the epistemic
limits of paternity, 189 and reveals newly relevant moral-hazard
concerns when linking intestacy law and federal social insurance. As
a practical matter, frozen sperm, eggs, and embryos may remain
viable indefinitely. 190 Whether or not estate law should permit
postmortem-conceived children to make claims on private estates,
decoupling the time of a child's conception from the lifespan of a
parent opens significant gaps between that body of law and survivor's
benefits. In effect, postmortem reproductive technology permits a
surviving parent to decide to create a child, 9 1 knowing both that the
other parent is already dead and unable to provide financial support
and that Social Security survivor's benefits may provide a guaranteed

186.
Pregnancy and fetal development occur between the legally significant actions that
lead to conception and the legally significant birth of an independent human life. The necessary
waiting that follows a decedent's choice to potentially create a dependent child does not
fundamentally change the obligations that attach when parents put a pregnancy into motion.
187.
See, e.g., Paul Glare, Editorial, Predicting and Communicating Prognosis in
Palliative Care, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 25, 2011, at 1 (using the case of Abdelbaset Ali
al-Megrahi-the Lockerbie bomber who survived for several years after a terminal prognosis led
to his early release from prison-to illustrate the uncertain nature of terminal prognoses).
188.
See, e.g., Jennifer Levine et al., Fertility Preservation in Adolescents and Young
Adults with Cancer, 28 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4831, 4835 (2010) ("Long-term follow-up studies
have demonstrated successful pregnancies with sperm stored between 10 and 28 years.").
189.
See, e.g., id.; Social Security Online, supra note 15.
190.
Maggie Davis, Comment, Indefinite Freeze?: The Obligations a Cryopreservation
Bank Has to Abandoned Frozen Embryos in the Wake of the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of
2006, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 379, 398 (2012).
191.
See, e.g., Jennifer A. Tash, et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Effect of
Instituting Guidelines, 170 J. UROLOGY 1922, 1923-24 (2003) (suggesting a period of mourning
can allow a bereaved woman to "differentiate between her previous married life and her
subsequent life without the deceased" before making decisions about reproduction "based on
thoughtful considerations of outcomes").
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source of public financing for the child's early years. 192 Postmortem
reproduction bypasses the primary risks that survivor's benefits
address, allowing the surviving parent to choose whether or not to
reproduce after a partner's death. The ability to plan for reproduction
after death introduces an element of moral hazard that was
essentially nonexistent when only death could create orphans.
The ability to plan a postmortem pregnancy likewise
undermines the justification for using intestacy law as a safety net to
catch unknown, unacknowledged, and unborn children. Given the
genetic certainty accompanying postmortem-conceived children,
intestate heuristics no longer offer any assistance in determining
likely biological kinship between a decedent and an applicant for
survivor's benefits.
Barring laboratory error, it is an absolute
certainty that a genetic parent-child relationship exists. That genetic
relationship is also largely irrelevant to the logic of social insurance,
as survivor's-benefits determinations depend not on genetic kinship,
but on social factors indicating that a child has a reasonable
expectation of continued support.193 Using state laws as a guide,
Social Security steps in to replace support that children lose when a
biological or legal parent dies. 194 But what expectation of support
attaches to lives set in motion with full knowledge that a parent has
already died?
E. Social Insuranceor Reproductive Subsidy?
Traditionally, a child becomes a survivor when her parent dies,
but a postmortem-conceived child acquires that status either at
conception or at birth. 195 Thus, while traditional Social Security

192.
See supra Part II. From a social-insurance perspective, this parenting situation is
analogous to that of a single person who chooses to adopt or to employ modern reproductive
technology to create a child using an anonymous sperm donor. People who choose to start or
expand their families as single parents would, conceivably, create benefits-eligible children if
they used gametes from people who died in states with permissive intestacy laws while people
who chose to bring children into single parent families in other ways would not receive federal
support through survivor's benefits. Aside from the peculiar possibility that state-by-state
variances might establish a market for prequalified semen, ova, or even fetuses, the more
pressing issue from a social-insurance perspective is that children knowingly brought into
single-parent families-by whatever means-have not suffered an insurable loss. Their
circumstances-at least with respect to family income-are precisely what they were at
conception.
193.
See supra Parts I.C, III.C.
194.
See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012).
195.
See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 58-59 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2680 (2012) (identifying the significance of the parent's death preceding the point at which the
postmortem-conceived descendent "come[s] into being" for distinguishing these children from
other survivors).
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survivor's benefits responded to death, these reconceived insurance
benefits now can spring from life. In the parlance of insurance, this
treats the deliberate, technologically facilitated birth of a child as a
covered loss. 196 Putting aside the political and legal implications of
treating a healthy birth as an injury to the child and the family,19 7
insurance generally does not compensate insured individuals whose
carefully orchestrated plans achieve their intended results; it
compensates for unexpected accidents. 198 The predictable conclusion
of a carefully planned, medically assisted pregnancy is decidedly
different from other categories of adverse events that typically trigger
insurance payments-automobile accidents, disability, fires, or the
death of a wage earner.
Survivor's benefits paid to
postmortem-conceived children may actually function as another type
of planned payment-subsidies. 199
Payments to postmortem-conceived children may more closely
resemble subsidieS 200 because, while social insurance spreads risk
across society, subsidies promote certain behaviors by making them
more profitable or less expensive than they would otherwise be. 2 0 1 For
example, tax deductions for interest on home mortgages are subsidies
because they effectively lower the cost of home ownership relative to
renting by allowing homeowners to pay the interest with untaxed
money; it is a subsidy that disproportionately benefits those who are
able to purchase a home. 202
Since benefits payments to
postmortem-conceived children also tie payments to voluntary
behavior, they might reasonably be thought of as subsidies. 203 This
leads to a peculiar outcome: a program initially designed to alleviate
the economic insecurity associated with "widows and orphans" 204
would, as a result of changed circumstances, effectively subsidize

196.

A covered loss is an event that triggers an insurance payment. Covered Loss,

BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/covered-loss.html

(last

visited Feb. 9, 2013).
197.
Even wrongful birth or wrongful life torts are predicated on the contention that, but
for a defendant's failure to provide relevant information, a plaintiff would have chosen to prevent
a birth. See Kelly E. Rhinehart, Student Article, The Debate Over Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Life, 26 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 142 (2002).
198.
See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 16 (defining insurance to require a loss beyond the
control of the insured).
199.
See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59.
200.
See id.
201.
See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and
Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 278 (2010).
202.
See id. at 264-65.
203.
See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59.
204.
See Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 4.
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medical interventions through which widows would create more
orphans. 205
Assuming that the people who choose to engage in postmortem
procreation act rationally, any subsidy would tend to increase the rate
of use. 2 06 Even if other concerns predominate the decision-making, the
effective reduction in cost or the perceived security of guaranteed
supplemental income to support the child will persuade some families
to undergo the procedures who would not have done so otherwise. 207
Increasing the rate of fertility procedures would channel additional
patients and payments to the individuals and institutions that provide
those medical services. Some of those payments will come from the
patients. Additional support will flow from private and public forms of
medical insurance. While it will be possible to limit the cost imposed
on others through limits on insurance coverage for expensive
technologically assisted reproductive procedures, it will not prevent
eighty-year-old Social Security legislation from effectively subsidizing
the increased utilization of modern elective medical procedures in
contravention of recent policy decisions about the efficient allocation of
medical resources. 208
These policy and budgetary concerns apply differently to social
insurance than to intestacy law because they deal with public funds. 209
Property law permits bizarre requests and bequests because of a
fundamental commitment to allowing property owners to dispose of
their estates according to their wishes. 2 10 Likewise, family law focuses
on chosen associations as well as biological relationships. These areas
of law give effect to private decisions, and when Social Security
While it may be jarring to think of children with one living and one deceased parent
205.
as orphans, that dissonance is itself a product of the Social Security survivor's benefits program.
BROWN, supra note 16, at 112 ("The provision for survivors benefits for younger widows and their
children in the 1939 revision of the Social Security Act did more to eliminate the word 'orphan'
from the American vocabulary than any other development.").
206.
For example:
[E]conomists had already indicted the [mortgage interest deduction] for distorting the
cost of owner-occupied housing relative to other investments, contributing to
overinvestment in the asset class and misallocation of capital stock, artificially raising
housing prices, disproportionately favoring high-income taxpayers, encouraging
over-consumption of bigger and more-expensive homes, and having ambiguous effects
on tenure choice (that is, the decision to own or rent).
Id. at 234 (footnotes omitted).
207.
See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 201, at 234.
208.
See generally Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost
Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 601, 601-03 (2010) (discussing how the Affordable Care Act will
reduce healthcare costs).
See supraPart III.B.
209.
See, e.g., THE ART OF THE STEAL (IFC Films 2009) (presenting an ongoing legal
210.
dispute over the Barnes art collection which, according to Albert Barnes's will, was never to be
moved from the Philadelphia home in which he assembled it).
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borrows rules and definitions from those areas of law, it may defer to
those private decisions. While these borrowings may be harmless,
they deserve scrutiny, especially when they invite small-scale
manipulations that might undermine public confidence in a crucial
social safety net.
IV. SOLUTION

While the Court's holding in Capato does not entirely preclude
an administrative reinterpretation of the old statutory scheme,
Congress should amend the Social Security Act to explicitly address
the survivor's-benefits eligibility of postmortem-conceived children.
The clear instructions of previous Congresses currently require the
Social Security Administration to look to state intestacy laws to
determine whether an applicant who claims to be the child of a
particular insured individual is that individual's "child" for the
purposes of Title 42.211 Congress also requires the Social Security
Administration to presume that a child depended on her parent,
regardless of how long that parent had been dead when the remaining
parent used medical technology to bring the child to life. 2 12 Together,
those congressional mandates require the Social Security
Administration to pay so-called insurance benefits even though the
absence of the insured parent (and the parent's financial support) was
an absolute certainty prior to the deliberate choices that brought these
lives into being. Congress's decision to yolk a federal program's
determinations of family status to state laws and to preclude any
meaningful inquiry into dependency created this perverse system;
Congress can and should correct the problem.
A. Legal Mechanism for Excluding Postmortem-ConceivedChildren
from Survivor's Benefits
While it would be possible to exclude postmortem-conceived
children from survivor's benefits by modifying the statutory definition
of "child" in 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) and the procedures for determining
family status in § 416(h), it would be better to leave family
determinations to the states and simply revise § 402(d)(3) to reflect
the current state of reproductive science. Just as the Code previously
recognized the exception to a presumption of support created by
adoption, 213 it should now recognize a similar exception for

211.
212.
213.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(B) (2006).
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This could be accomplished with a simple

A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or his mother or
adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) unless, at such time, such
individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child and
(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or
(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual, or
(C) such child was born as a result of a pregnancy initiated after the death of such
214
individual.

By modifying the survivor's-benefits program's presumptions
about dependency rather than the definition of family relationships,
this solution honors both the states' traditional role in family law and
the federal government's authority to establish the parameters of
federal programs.
B. Impact of Excluding Postmortem-Conceived Childrenfrom
Survivor's Benefits
The above modification would free states to explore various
options for balancing a property owner's interest in shaping the
distribution of personal property against the state's (and heirs')
interests in timeliness and finality, without entangling federal
benefits programs. As discussed above, states are already finding
various ways to honor the choices that individuals make to utilize
reproductive technology and to distribute their property after death. 215
Eliminating an accidental subsidy on postmortem reproduction will
eliminate any undue influence such a subsidy might have on the
important policy decisions about family and property law being made
in each state.
Drawing a clear line at death would free surviving spouses and
partners from any perceived need to rush decisions about whether to
conceive in the midst of the turmoil surrounding a death. 216 While the
214.
Compare the suggested text with the current version:
A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or his mother or
adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1)(C) unless, at such time, such
individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child
and(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or
(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual.
Id.

§ 402(d)(3).

215.
See supra Part II.D.
Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 268 (Mass. 2002) (dictum) ("In
216.
the case of posthumously conceived children, the application of [a] one-year limitations
period . . . requires, in effect, that the survivor make a decision to bear children while in the
freshness of grieving.").
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states have some interest in the timely and orderly disposition of
estates, the federal government has no legitimate interest in a
use-it-or-lose-it postmortem procreation subsidy that could push
grieving survivors to follow through with ex ante plans made with the
deceased, nor does the federal government have a legitimate interest
in encouraging, through a faux-insurance subsidy, the hasty creation
of one life in response to the loss of another. The federal government
should not unnecessarily disturb individuals grieving a loss,
celebrating a life, and reflecting on the future by incentivizing hasty
decisions in the aftermath of a death.
Limiting survivor's benefits to lives in being at the time of the
death would prevent a program intended to stabilize the financial
footing of widows and orphans from drifting into subsidizing
technologically assisted reproduction. While society may determine
that it has an interest in supporting certain forms of reproductive
assistance for all or some of its people, an accidental subsidy of the
sort currently offered would most benefit those families that are
wealthy enough to engage in the often expensive prospect of
technologically assisted reproduction. It is difficult to imagine a
justification for preferentially subsidizing medically. enhanced
reproduction.
It is considerably easier to envision a few
well-publicized instances of such a practice eroding public support for
the broader survivor's benefit program. 2 17 Instead, preserving the
character of the program as a safety net for the widows and orphans of
President Roosevelt's signing statement would leave legislators free to
debate the merits of deliberate government action in other areas
relevant to the new technology.
V. CONCLUSION

As early as 1866, a scientist studying the physiology of sperm
cells speculated that someday "a man dying on the battlefield may
beget a legal heir with his semen frozen and stored at home." 1 8
Today, the technology that makes it possible for that dying man to
beget a biological heir is an accepted part of the US medical
landscape. 21 9 States will continue to adjust intestacy law and property
law to accommodate these technological advances, extending
measured inheritance rights that balance the traditional interests of
the state, the decedent, and the potential heirs to private estates. So
long as the Social Security Act remains as written, those changes to
217.
218.
219.

See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 201, at 234.
Anger, et al., supra note 20.
See generally Sparrow, supra note 14, at 173-74, 181.
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the systems of state laws that distribute private fortunes will continue
to dictate the terms by which public funds meant to provide security to
widows and orphans are instead distributed to subsidize knowing
private choices to create heirs for the dead.
diligent
with
coupled
speculation
imaginative
As
experimentation continues to expand the possibilities for human
In the case of survivor's benefits,
action, the law must adapt.
Congress's reasonable delegation in the 1930s of certain parent-child
determinations to state law and its presumption that all children once
depended on their parents' incomes is no longer reasonable. That
delegation depended on assumptions that no longer hold true because
technology has given birth to exceptions. Congress's clear instructions
It is up to
preclude an administrative or judicial adjustment.
from
Security
of
Social
function
the
insurance
uncouple
Congress to
the distinct state functions of intestacy law. Congress can accomplish
this uncoupling by gently adjusting the presumption of dependency to
account for the technology that allows humans to reproduce not only
in anticipation of death but also as a response to it.
In doing so, Congress should extend survivor's benefits only to
those children who actually survived the death of a parent-those who
suffered the kind of loss contemplated by the drafters of the Social
Security Act. The lives of children knowingly conceived after a
biological parent's death are not losses for which we need social
They are, instead, the quintessential example of
insurance.
technology that has made it possible for human beings to reduce the
impact of chance on reproduction. Congress would be wise to continue
to rely on states to police the boundaries of complicated family
relationships; however, Congress should not rely entirely on the
states' determinations of rights to private property when
administering a public system of social insurance. Social insurance
and intestacy law draw on different resources to solve different
problems. Those differences cause these systems to justifiably give
different weights to private intentions and public determinations.
Ignoring these distinctions in the face of advancing technology creates
potential inefficiencies and injustices. By distinguishing lives created
after death from those in being at the time of death when determining
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eligibility for survivor's benefits, the solution proposed in this Note
would preserve the social-insurance function of survivor's benefits.
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